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Abstract
We show how a brand manufacturers control over retail prices can lead to e¢ cien-
cies when consumers rely on prices as a signal of quality. For this we rst show how
higher prices can be associated with both higher quality perception as well as higher
actual quality. We next identify a conict of interest between retailers and manu-
factures. Retailers do not internalize the ensuing reputation spill-over that higher
prices have on demand at all outlets. And they have less incentives to support brand
image through higher prices as this erodes their own position in negotiations while
increasing that of the manufacturer. Our e¢ ciency defence for RPM thus applies
even when retailers need not be incentivized to undertake non-contractible activities,
as in our model the key opportunism problem, with respect to quality provision, lies
between the manufacturer and consumers.
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1 Introduction
For many fast-moving consumer goods, notably in food retailing, quality depends on a
manufacturers ongoing e¤ort, such as to procure high-quality inputs or to secure high
hygienic standards in production and handling. Consumers in turn may not always be
able to assess a products quality before purchasing and may, amongst other things, rely
on prices as a signal of quality. In this article we rst set up a simple model that motivates
a positive relationship between prices and both perceived as well as actual quality. We
next show how this relationship gives rise to a conict of interest between retailers and
manufacturers, as manufacturers prefer a strictly higher price. When prices are set in
retailersindividual interests, they do not internalize the full reputation spill-over for the
manufacturers good. The conict of interest is aggravated by the fact that prices are
chosen also so as to thereby inuence retailersand manufacturersbargaining position,
which depends on consumersperception of the products quality. Overall, equilibrium
quality and e¢ ciency can be higher when, by means of retail price maintenance (RPM),
manufactures exert greater control over retail prices.
Our contribution, notably to the literature on RPM, is to identify an e¢ ciency gain
that applies in particular to branded goods and that does not rely on non-contractible,
sales-enhancing activities of retailers. In particular, it is thus applicable to many fast
moving consumer goods, such as in food retailing, where even the sta¤ of "bricks and
mortar" retailers does not interact directly with consumers, e.g., to provide advice. Our
theory thus provides a rationale for why branded goods manufacturers may be particularly
eager to keep control over the retail price, even when retailers need not be incentivized to
provide such services and even when, as we show, intrabrand competition is not the main
concern. The reason, in our model, is the link between price and quality image together
with a conict of interest.
In this respect, our e¢ ciency defence for RPM may apply also when various distribu-
tion channels, such as "o­ ine" and "online", do not di¤er in the provision of other services
to consumers, such as advice or shopping experience. Attempts of brand manufacturers
to control of prices in online distribution have in fact been at the forefront at many recent
antitrust cases.1 The European Unions recently redrafted block exemption regulation for
1For instance, Lindsay (2011) reports, in particular, two recent cases of, inter alia, minimum RPM
provisions for online sales (Bioelements, a skin-care products manufacturer, and Tempur-Pedic, a seller of
premium mattresses). He observes a substantially di¤erent treatment of these clauses by the respective
Californian and New York Attorney General, suggesting that also in the US the discussion about RPM is
far from over even after the much discussed Leegin decision of the Supreme Court in 2007.
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vertical restraints and the respective guidelines consequently make specic reference to
online sales. While the text recognizes the role of a products "image" as a justication for
selective distribution systems, this does not extend to the control prices across channels
to uphold such an "image". Also, a di¤erential treatment of online distribution channels
seems to be justied only when these lack the provision of additional services, thus mirror-
ing theories that, in contrast to ours, build on retailer moral hazard.2 Our theory suggests
that this approach is too narrow to account for the relevance of a products "image".
The relationship between price and quality perception, on which our theory builds, has
been widely covered in the business literature, notably in marketing.3 An "image theory"
of RPM has also been occasionally acknowledged in the legal literature, though to our
knowledge it has been largely ignored by competition economics.4 Among legal scholars, for
instance, Orbach (2008, 2010) builds a legal defence of RPM on such an image theoryof
prices. The argument there rests however on a more di¤use notion of "brand image", which
is a¤ected by price choice and which is assumed to generate consumer welfare. This relates
to Leibensteins (1950) theory of conspicuous consumptionand consumerswillingness
to pay a price above the intrinsic value to achieve exclusivity.5 As we equate "brand
image" with "quality image" in our model, we can however derive potential e¢ ciency gains
directly from more standard consumer preferences.
In our model, a higher price will be associated with higher quality and higher per-
ception of quality by those consumers who do not directly observe quality choice. When
the manufacturer controls the retail price, he will fully internalize the benets from an
overall higher perception of quality. Precisely, when consumers form beliefs based on their
2The Vertical Restraints Block Exemption Regulation and accompanying Guidelines came into force
on 1 June 2010. For instance, with regards to online distributors manufactures may require the provision
of after sales services or the presence of physical locations and showrooms. Cf. European Commission
Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L
102, 23.4.2010 and European Commission Notice - Guidelines on vertical restraints, O¢ cial Journal C
130, 19.05.2010, p. 1.
3In fact, the marketing literature often mentions, in this context, the dual role of prices, namely as a
constraint to rms and as a product attribute that conveys information, rendering it the "most immediate
and easiest to communicate marketing-mix variable" (Rao 1984; cf. Erickson and Johansson (1985) for
another example and Leavitt (1954) for a very early contribution). Völckner and Hofmann (2007) provide
a meta analysis of the empirical literature, which establishes a positive relationship between prices and
perceived as well as actual quality, even beyond higher costs associated with the provision of higher quality.
4In Marvel and McCa¤erty (1984) low-cost retailers may free-ride on the quality certication provided
by higher-cost retailers. While a higher margin promised to retailers thus ensures that also high-cost
retailers stock (and thereby certify) a high-quality good, it is the availability of products at these retailers
and not a particular price itself that generates the respective quality perception.
5This goes directly back to Veblen (1899), as well as Taussigs (1916) notion of "articles of prestige".
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perception of prices across all retailers and shopping trips, the manufacturer internalizes
this. In contrast, retailers tend to free-ride on the quality perception generated by other
retailerschoice of prices. We derive conditions for when an induced increase in quality
dominates deadweight loss from a higher price, which is the case precisely when quality
perceptions matter more as more consumers must rely on them for their purchases.
A second channel through which such a di¤erence in interests between manufacturers
and retailers a¤ects prices and quality is the e¤ect that the products (perceived) quality
has on the outside options of manufacturers and retailers. Retailers may set a lower price
also so as to thereby induce lower quality perceptions, which decreases the outside option
of the manufacturer and enhances retailersown outside option in case they later stock a
di¤erent product. Notably, under our chosen bargaining solution, such a conict of interest
would not arise when quality was exogenous, as then retailers and the manufacturer would
choose the same price. Hence, the fact that quality is endogenous and a¤ected by prices
is essential also for this potential conict of interest between retailers and manufacturers
to arise in our model. Again, quality is higher when the manufacturer controls the price.
In our baseline model, a higher price induces higher quality when this choice is observed
by at least some consumers (or when it is observed with positive probability by any given
consumer). All other consumers form rational expectations. This model and its analysis
serve two purposes. First, to some extent it is of interest in its own right as we clearly
isolate, already in this simple model, three channels for why consumers may rightly an-
ticipate a positive relationship between prices and quality. Second and more importantly,
the model provides a simple starting point to introduce the conict of interest between
retailers and the considered manufacturer. That said, we are aware that a number of the-
oretical papers in the industrial organization literature have associated price and quality
perception, albeit not in the context of vertical relationships and not applied to antitrust
issues, notably Klein and Le­ er (1981), Shapiro (1983), and Wolinsky (1983).6
To model negotiations between a manufacturer and several, possibly competing retail-
ers, we use a bargaining approach that extends an idea from Inderst and Wey (2003).
6Also in models where quality is exogenously given, high-quality rms may use high prices to signal the
superiority of their products (e.g., Bagwell and Riordan (1991) or Milgrom and Roberts (1986), where high
prices are used in combination with dissipative advertising). Noteworthy may also be a very early article in
the Review of Economic Studies by Scitovszky (1944), who notes: [. . . ] in the United States expensive
is in the process of losing its original meaning and becoming a synonym for superior quality. Worse still,
one of the largest American breweries uses the advertising slogan: Michelob, Americas highest-priced
beer!According to his reasoning and in line with the subsequent formalizations, including the one given
in this paper, uninformed consumers can rely on a positive relationship between price and demand as
"expert consumers" would not buy a high-price product if it was of low quality.
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Under this solution concept, each bilateral contract species a "fair" sharing rule to the
net surplus generated under all possible agreements (coalitions). As we will discuss, the
obtained solution is closely related to other recent solution concepts to multilateral nego-
tiations, such as De Fontenay and Gans (2013). One of our contributions is to show the
applicability of this solution concept, as in our setting it gives rise to relatively simple and
intuitive expressions.
As noted above, our theory is di¤erent from extant theories that deal with the e¢ -
ciency implications of manufacturerscontrol over retail prices, notably through RPM, as
these typically build on retailer non-contractible actions, such as the keeping of inven-
tories (Deneckere et al. 1997) or the provision of services and other demand-enhancing
activities (e.g., Telser 1960; Klein and Murphy 1988; Mathewson and Winter 1998; see,
however, Romano 1994 for a setting where both parties make a non-price decision a¤ecting
demand). We already noted that our theory is instead applicable to goods and markets
where retailers do not provide this type of services, such as advice, or where this can be
explicitly contracted for. In fact, for many branded products in areas such as grocery or
cosmetics it may be manufacturers who must be incentivized to constantly ensure high
quality. The key opportunism problem then lies between manufacturers and consumers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model
and establishes a relationship between price and quality. Section 3 introduces retailers.
Section 4 considers non-competing retailers and isolates a conict of interest that arises
from free-riding on quality (brand) image. In Section 5 we introduce retailer competition.
Section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 The Relationship between Price and Quality
2.1 Model
In this section we consider rst an auxiliary model to introduce the basic relationship
between price and quality. In this model, a manufacturer sells directly to nal consumers,
so that we presently abstract from the presence of intermediaries. Demand for the rms
product depends on the products price p and a scalar indicator of quality q  0: D(p; q).
The suppliers costs depend on quantity x = D(p; q) and quality: c(x; q). As we will discuss
in what follows, the positive relationship between price and quality that we derive in this
section holds generally whenever cqx  0, i.e., when per-unit costs of production are weakly
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increasing in quality.7 Our motivational examples in the introduction suggest however a
specication where costs of ensuring higher quality change proportional with quantity:
c (x; q) = k (q)x. For instance, this should be the case when higher costs result from the
procurement of higher-quality inputs or from ensuring higher hygienic and safety standards
in production and shipment. Here, k (q) is assumed to be a twice di¤erentiable function
with k0 (q) > 0 for q > 0 and k00 (q)  0. The suppliers prots are  = D(p; q) [p  k(q)].
We further specify that Dp < 0 and Dq > 0 where D > 0.
For the present auxiliary analysis, we now consider the following game. First, in t = 1,
the rm chooses a price p. Then, in t = 2, it chooses a quality q. Finally, in t = 3,
consumers decide whether to purchase or not. We discuss the sequence of timing in t = 1
and t = 2 below. Further, before purchasing a consumer only observes with probability 
the true quality. As we restrict consideration to equilibria in pure strategies, we denote an
uninformed consumers beliefs by bq. These will depend on the observed price choice.
Before analyzing this game, we comment on the choice of the sequence of timing in
t = 1 and t = 2. Our focus throughout this paper is on price as a (relatively) longer term
choice (cf. also the additional discussion in Section). It is part of the overall positioning
of the product, i.e., its branding. In practice, the decision on the overall price level must
then be complementary to the other marketing choices such as the scope and content of
the advertising campaign. While surely some key (quality) features of the product are also
chosen for the long term, with a view particularly on fast moving consumer goods and
notably branded food products, we consider decisions that must be made constantly so as
to maintain high quality. As mentioned previously, this could concern the procurement
of high-quality inputs or the overall conditions of production and handling of the product
(e.g., with regards to food safety). The manufacturer could be tempted to save costs by
reducing care or using cheaper inputs.
2.2 Equilibrium of the Auxiliary Game
We solve the game backwards. Consumersdecision in t = 3 is already captured by the
demand function. A given consumer is only informed with probability  about the true
quality choice. With probability 1    a consumer is uninformed and has the beliefs bq.
Demand is thus given by bx = D(p; q) + (1  )D(p; bq);
7This is however not a necessary but only a su¢ cient condition.
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so that rm prots are
(p; q; bq) = bx [p  k(q)] ; (1)
depending on price, actual quality, and quality beliefs. Actual quality a¤ects demand
only when the consumer is informed. For given beliefs bq, the optimal quality qBR is thus
determined from (1) by the following rst order condition:
d
dq
 (p; q; bq)
q=qBR
=  [p  k(qBR)]Dq (p; qBR)  bxBRk0 (qBR) = 0; (2)
where we used bxBR = D(p; qBR) + (1   )D(p; bq). (Here, the notation qBR refers to the
fact that this is the "best response" to a particular choice of the price and consumers
beliefs.) We stipulate that  is strictly concave in q so that there is always a unique value
qBR. This, as well as uniqueness for the subsequently solved programs, holds, in particular,
for the (linear-quadratic) specication that is used for illustration below.
In equilibrium, given the price p that is set initially and that is observed by all con-
sumers, beliefs must be rational. In a slight extension of notation, it is thus required thatbq = qBR(bq) (where it is convenient to suppress for now the dependency on the price). We
denote this level, for given p, by bq. Using the condition for qBR from (2), bq must solve
z(p; bq) :=  [p  k (bq)]Dq (p; bq) D(p; bq)k0 (bq) = 0: (3)
Again, we assume that this gives rise to a unique interior solution and obtain from implicit
di¤erentiation
dbq
dp
=
1
 zbq
24 Dq(p; bq) k0(bq)Dp(p; bq)
+ (p  k(bq))Dpq(p; bq)
35 ; (4)
where we have already split-up the three terms that we discuss below in turn. Note that
zbq < 0.8 Hence, the sign of dbq=dp is determined by the expression in rectangular brackets
in (4). This expression comprises three di¤erent e¤ects that the price level has on quality,
which we discuss next.
Relationship between Price and Quality. The term in the rst line of (4) is strictly
positive. When the price and thus also the margin is higher, the rm has more to gain by
sustaining demand through choosing a higher quality. This is the most immediate e¤ect
that a higher price has on the manufacturers incentives to maintain quality at a high
8Precisely, this follows from inspection of the second-order derivative of rm prots, i.e., from di¤er-
entiation of the rst-order condition (2), and noting that Dq > 0 and k0 > 0.
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level. The strength of this e¤ect hinges on the likelihood with which quality is observed
(or, likewise, on the respective fraction of informed consumers). The second line in (4) is
also strictly positive from Dp < 0 and k0 > 0:9 As the price increases and demand thereby
decreases, an increase in the per-unit costs, when this is associated with higher quality,
has a smaller negative impact on overall rm prots. This e¤ect is independent of the
observability of quality. We turn next to the last e¤ect, as captured by the nal line in
(4). This term is zero when the marginal utility of an increase in quality is independent
of the level of a consumers valuation. This holds, for instance, when demand is linear
and separable in p and q. But the e¤ect is strictly positive when consumers with a higher
absolute valuation also have a higher marginal valuation for quality.10 Then, as the price
is higher, this increases the responsiveness of demand with respect to quality.
In what follows, we always stipulate that Dpq  0, so that altogether, from the three
discussed e¤ects, a higher price will strictly increase the rms incentives to maintain high
quality.
Lemma 1 When Dpq  0 holds, then at stage t = 2 in the auxiliary model quality, as
obtained in (3), strictly increases with price: dbq=dp > 0.
As we are presently only interested in the relationship between price and quality, we
are silent about e¢ ciency. When  = 1, we can, however, directly refer to the analysis in
Spence (1975) and conclude that for any given price the resulting quality bq is ine¢ ciently
low. As we have immediately from (3) that bq is strictly increasing in , this ine¢ ciency
becomes more severe as  < 1:
Equilibrium Price Level. To determine the price that the manufacturer chooses in
t = 1, it is instructive to rst consider the case where  = 1, in which case all consumers
can observe quality. We already noted that then bq, which is determined in (3), also solves
the rst-order condition (2). Turning to t = 1, from the envelope theorem we can thus
conclude that for  = 1 the optimal price p is then determined simply by setting the
respective partial derivative with respect to p equal to zero. This is, however, no longer
the case when  < 1. Then, for a given price, the resulting equilibrium quality bq will
be strictly below the value that would maximize ex-ante rm prots. The rm thus has
9This e¤ect would be absent when, with general cost of production c(x; q), we had cqx = 0, so that
costs of quality provision were independent of actual output.
10More formally, there could be a continuum of consumers, indexed by y, with respective utility qy.
Then, the critical type is ey = p=q, so that with distribution F (y) demand is D (p; q) = 1  F (ey).
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a commitment problem vis-à-vis consumers. To derive the optimal price p for general ,
in a slight abuse of notation denote now (p; bq) = (p; q = bq; bq = bq). With a slight
transformation, the rst-order condition in t = 1 becomes
d(p; bq)
dp
= [p  k (bq)]Dp(p; bq) +D(p; bq) (5)
+
dbq
dp
(1  ) [p  k (bq)]Dq(p; bq)
= 0:
As noted above, the second line in (5) is equal to zero when all consumers are informed so
that then (and only then) the rst-order condition is obtained from the partial derivative
with respect to the price.
Lemma 2 In the equilibrium of the auxiliary model, the optimal price p that is chosen by
the manufacturer in t = 1 solves (5).
We again suppose that there is a unique price equilibrium. We denote this price by p
with corresponding quality bq(p) = q. We will make use of condition (5) in our extended
model below. When we provide an illustration of the equilibrium characterization in the
following section, we make further use of the presently solved auxiliary model.
3 Introducing Retailers and Negotiations
We now introduce retailers indexed by n = 1; :::; N . As will become clear from the following
analysis, when there is only a single retailer, then the interests of the manufacturer and
of the single retailer (with respect to how the retail price is set) will be perfectly aligned.
This is no longer the case when there are multiple retailers, even when they are not in
competition with each other. In fact, below we will isolate two di¤erent sources of such
a conict of interest, one arising from a free-riding problem and one arising from the
way retail prices a¤ect outside options and, thereby, the distribution of surplus through
negotiations. For this analysis, we have to rst set up and provide a solution to the
bargaining problem between the manufacturer and retailers. This is done in the present
section.
Timing. Our timing, which we discuss subsequently in detail, is as follows. Retail prices,
now pn, are still set in the rst period t = 1. Our key analysis will be the comparison
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of equilibrium outcomes when these are chosen individually by retailers or when they
are perfectly controlled by the manufacturer (RPM). In t = 2 the manufacturer chooses
quality. Before demand is realized, as consumers make their choice, in the presence of
retailers there are now negotiations in t = 3. The respective solution concept is introduced
below.
Our choice of timing, where retail prices are set rst, serves the following purposes and
has the following motivation. Essentially it deprives wholesale contracts of their steering
role, as these are used in t = 3 only to distribute prots. Also, it emphasizes that retail
prices should often be relatively persistent, giving rise to a particular "price image" with
consumers. In fact, outside clearly specied promotional activities, retailers - and even
more so manufacturers - may indeed want to provide such a consistent price image.11 The
role of (marginal) wholesale prices to control retailerspricing decisions even outside RPM
arrangements may also be limited in practice, which in our view is not adequately reected
by games that consider a rst-stage unconstrained commitment of a manufacturer to some
arbitrary wholesale contract. Notably, antitrust authorities may consider the choice of
nonlinear wholesale contracts as inducements to adhere to high recommended retail prices
and as such functionally equivalent to RPM and thus illegal. Direct evidence for such
a strict practice comes from recent guidance of the German competition authority to
manufacturers and retailers (Bundeskartellamt 2010, Becker 2013), which made explicit
reference to restrictions on such inducements.12 Such a wide enforcement of a ban on
RPM and on other means through which manufacturers may exert control over prices
should further justify the comparison of the regimes of retailer "price ownership" and
manufacturer "price ownership" in this paper.
Interestingly, as we show below, our chosen set-up also allows to clearly isolate the role
of quality and quality perception, as with exogenously xed quality prices as well as the
distribution of prots would not depend on the allocation of such "price ownership". On
a nal note, though equally important for our motivation of timing, compared to much of
the extant literature, where wholesale contracts are chosen rst in a one-shot game, the
11There are also menu costs associated with a change of retail prices, as emphasized in the macroeco-
nomic literature (cf. recently Nakamura and Steinsson 2008). The picture of a rather consistent price - in
particular, outside promotions - is also conrmed by Hosken and Rei¤en (2004). For a model that derives
a relative persistence of prices from consumerspreferences (given loss aversion) see Heidhues and Köszegi
(2008).
12Other jurisdictions are arguably more permissive about the use of practices that are, to some extent,
functionally equivalent to RPM. Notably in this respect is the use of recommended retail prices combined
with a threat of suspension of delivery under the so called "Colgate doctrine" in the US, which is not
permitted in Europe (cf. for a comparison Waelbroeck 2006).
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reversal of timing should also reect practices in various retailing industries. There, even
the signing of yearly framework agreements does not prevent retailers from continuously
asking for (lump-sum) rebates and trying to renegotiate contracts. After all, a retailer
can always stop ordering the product ("running out of stock") without being in breach
of any initial contract. When at this stage retail prices have already been communicated
(e.g., through prospects), they determine the stakes at this renegotiation stage, while
initial wholesale contracts would be inconsequential.13 By taking this admittedly stark
perspective, we can focus on the di¤erence in retailersand the manufacturers preferences
with respect to, in particular, the role of the retail price as a means to communicate quality
image. In our model, this is derived fully from primitives. And to the extent that wholesale
contracts are open for renegotiations in the described sense, they are no substitute for a
direct control over the retail price, so that RPM is, in this sense, also essential for the
subsequently derived e¢ ciencies.
Solution Concept. We now introduce multilateral negotiations at the beginning of t =
3. A large part of the literature typically assumes that one side, notably the manufacturer,
can commit to make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers, thereby reducing all other parties to their
outside options. An important shortcoming of this approach, in particular in light of
our application, is that thereby the outside option of the proposing party and with this
any (price-setting) strategies to a¤ect it would not come into play. De Fontenay and
Gans (2013), building on Stole and Zwiebel (1996), represents one recent contribution in
the literature that allows for proposals by both sides in a noncooperative (open-ended)
bargaining game. There is also a literature that applies cooperative game theory to,
generally speaking, bargaining in networks with externalities (that is, when retailers are
in competition).
It turns out that applied to our setting, the general approach that we propose next
yields the same outcome as when we applied the non-cooperative approach of De Fontenay
and Gans (2013) or also one of the existing cooperative approaches (discussed below). We
feel, however, that our approach, which builds on Inderst and Wey (2003), is, at least in
13In fact, to bring it closer in line with the extant literature, we could simply introduce a pre-contracting
period t = 0 where, following some bargaining protocol, bilateral wholesale contracts may be determined.
Right before determining how much to order (or, what is quite equivalent in practice, whether to reposition
products at some disadvantaged "death row" shelf space), retailers would now start renegotiations. All
that is now, at short notice, exible are bilateral transfers. When retailersannouncement to order little
or nothing at the originally agreed terms or to reshelf the product is credible as a threat point, just as
the making of a "take-it-or-leave-it" o¤er is deemed credible in most games of wholesale contracting, all
agreements in t = 0 are inconsequential.
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the present application, particularly straightforward and intuitive. To formalize it, denote
the manufacturer by M and each retailer by Rn with n = 1; :::; N . As we will for t = 1
focus on a symmetric price equilibrium and as retailers will also be otherwise symmetric,
we can restrict our subsequently introduced notation to the case where at most one retailer
is di¤erent (through charging a di¤erent price). Without loss of generality we let this be
retailer R1, so that at most p1 6= p. A possible set of agreements can thus be described by
the total number of agreeing retailers (i  N) and by whether this contains R1. Denote by
1In(i) the joint prots of the ("Insider") coalition of i retailers that agrees withM , where
the superscript 1 denotes that this contains R1. The respective notation when this does
not contain R1 is 0In(i), i.e., with superscript 0. For all non-agreeing outsiders denote
the individual prot by 1Out(i) when R1 agrees and when R1 does not agree by 
0
Out;R1(i)
for R1 and by 0Out;Rn(i) for all other N   i  1 non-agreeing retailers.
As at t = 3 contracts only serve the distribution of joint prots, we can suppress a
separate notation for the respective transfers and characterize the outcome directly in terms
of payo¤s. A bilateral agreement now conditions, as in Inderst and Wey (2003), on what
we call a "contingency", which is here the set of other retailers to which the manufacturer
supplies. We can thus think of a bilateral agreement as, in our context, a vector of
transfers that conditions on the manufacturers supply relations. While in equilibrium
(cf. below) the manufacturer will supply all retailers, the transfers and resulting payo¤s
for all other contingencies will be payo¤ relevant as outside options. While we feel that
such contingent contracting is also to some extent realistic, as we explore below, it can
also be regarded more simply as part of a bargaining solution that thereby ensures that a
partys contribution to various subcoalitions also inuences its equilibrium payo¤. For a
contingency where M and R1 agree, denote the respective payo¤ of the manufacturer by
V 1M(i), that of R1 by V
1
R1(i), and that of the other i 1 agreeing retailers by V 1Rn(i). When
R1 and M do not agree, the payo¤ of the manufacturer is denoted by V 0M(i) and that of
the agreeing retailers by V 0Rn(i).
For each contingency we require that the respective contracts and thus the resulting
payo¤s satisfy "balancedness": The incremental joint payo¤, that is relative to the state
without this additional agreement, is equal for both sides. For an agreement with R1 this
is the case if and only if
V 1M(i)  V 0M(i  1) = V 1R1(i)  0Out;R1(i  1); (6)
which must hold for all i. Turning to an agreement with any other retailer Rn, we must
make the following distinction: For a contingency where there is also agreement with R1,
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equal division of the incremental joint payo¤ requires that
V 1M(i)  V 1M(i  1) = V 1Rn(i)  1Out(i  1); (7)
while for a contingency without an agreement with R1 we have likewise that
V 0M(i)  V 0M(i  1) = V 0Rn(i)  0Out;Rn(i  1): (8)
Conditions (6) to (8) complete the characterization of our solution concept.
Solution. The following characterization will be restricted to prices set in t = 1 that
ensure that joint prots are maximized with the "grand coalition", i = N . This implies,
in particular, that the possibly deviating price p1 does not fall too short of p. This
restriction is without loss of generality, provided the alternative supply option is su¢ ciently
unattractive. In light of future calculations we also derive a simplied characterization for
the case where all retailers are symmetric as also p1 = p. Then, prots of stand-alone
retailers only depend on the number of agreeing retailers and can be more simply denoted
by Out(i), while joint prots for the agreeing coalition can, again by symmetry, be written
as 1In(i) = iIn(i).
Proposition 1 When there are N retailers, suppose that at N 1 retailers the same price
p prevails, while at most one retailer chooses potentially a di¤erent price. Assume without
loss of generality that the latter retailer is R1. The bargaining outcome in t = 3 must
satisfy the imposed property of "balancedness" across all contingencies (i.e., all possible
sets of agreements). Then, the manufacturers payo¤ equals
V M =
1
N(N + 1)
" PN 1
i=0 (i+ 1)

1In(i+ 1)  0Out;R1(i)  i1Out(i)

+
PN 1
i=1
Pi
j=1

0In(j)  j0Out;Rn(j   1)
 # (9)
and with symmetric retailers and thus also p1 = p abbreviates to
V M =
1
N + 1
NX
i=1
i [In(i)  Out(i  1)] : (10)
The payo¤ of retailer R1 is
V R1 = V

M + 
0
Out;R1(N   1) 
1
N
N 1X
i=1

0In(i)  i0Out;Rn(i  1)

; (11)
and with symmetry it equals the payo¤ of all other retailers Rn and can be written as
V R = V

M  
1
N
"
N 1X
i=1
iIn(i) 
NX
i=1
iOut(i  1)
#
: (12)
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Proof. See Appendix.
The composition of payo¤s is particularly transparent in case of symmetry, i.e., with
expressions (10) and (12). The manufacturers payo¤ from negotiations thus represents
a weighted average, that is over all possible coalitions, of the incremental value that is
generated at any given retailer. With respect to R1, whose price choice we will later
consider, we have expressed the equilibrium payo¤ V R1 so that the di¤erence to that of the
manufacturer, V M , is immediately seen. We comment on this di¤erence in detail below, as
it will drive the di¤erence in price setting incentives. Intuitively, the manufacturers payo¤
relative to that of any retailer is higher when his product generates a higher incremental
surplus, i.e., when it generates a higher gross surplus in each bilateral relationship (i.e.,
the rst term in rectangular brackets in expression (12)) and when a retailers alternative
is less protable (i.e., the second term in (12)), again weighted over all possible coalitions.
Navarro (2007) derives a bargaining value for general networks with externalities by
extending the "fair allocation" or "balancedness" rule of Myerson (1977a/b). This require-
ment mirrors the equal sharing of net surplus, which we impose for all contingencies (on
which the agreement conditions in our approach). Applying Navarros bargaining value
to our specic setting yields Proposition 1. As noted already above, this value is also
obtained in De Fontenay and Gans (2013) from a non-cooperative approach, where an
individual disagreement restarts negotiations. All these specications thus ensure that
equilibrium payo¤s depend more broadly on the potential prots achieved under various
possible agreements (or coalitions). Our subsequent analysis also reveals that our qualita-
tive insights are more general, relying on the insight that quality and quality perceptions,
as determined by prices, a¤ect di¤erently retailersand the manufacturers payo¤s both
with and without an agreement.
Auxiliary Case: Exogenous Quality. Suppose for a moment that quality was exoge-
nously given. We now argue that then at t = 1 the same price equilibrium is obtained
regardless of whether prices pn are chosen by individual retailers or by the manufacturer.
To see this, we consider a variation in p1. Observe now that in the di¤erence in prots
V M   V R1 =
1
N
N 1X
i=1

0In(i)  i0Out;Rn(i  1)
  0Out;R1(N   1) (13)
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none of the terms depends directly on p1 simply as they all relate to contingencies where
there is no agreement with retailer R1. Consequently, we have indeed
@
@p1
V M   V R1jq xed = 0: (14)
This observation is important as it ensures that the subsequently discussed conict of
interest between retailers and the manufacture with regards to retail prices is due only to
the implications that prices have for quality and quality perception.
4 Reputation Spillover
In this section, we abstract from downstream retail competition. Without competition,
the prots that are realized at any given retailer do not depend directly on whether the
manufacturers product is also sold at other retailers (and at what price). This allows
to isolate the aforementioned free-riding problem, on which this section focuses. We still
suppose that consumers are aware of the prices that have been set at all other retailers.
For instance, this could be through advertising, but also through other shopping trips that
are, however, not considered to be substitutes (e.g., as the product is not storable and
consumers only decide on the basis of convenience at any given instance).
As in Section 2 the rst step in the analysis is to derive the equilibrium quality bq
at t = 2 for given prices pn. This is accomplished by requiring that the manufacturers
optimal choice qBR equals the expectations of uninformed consumers bq. The only di¤erence
is that now, in the presence of retailers, qBR maximizes V M , as given in Proposition 1. We
relegate the formal details to the proof of Proposition 2. For given bq, as a function of
prices pn, we can next use the present specication that retailers serve separate markets so
as to heavily simplify the expressions for payo¤s and to subsequently solve for equilibrium
prices.
Without competition, prots realized at an individual retailer do not directly depend
on choices at other retailers and we can thus write, even when p1 6= p, each bilateral prot
as (pn; bq) = [p  k (bq)] [D(p; bq)   k(bq)]. Note also that "outside option" payo¤s for
each retailer are independent of prices at all other retailers and also of the manufacturers
quality (and can thus be simply denoted by Out). With this at hands, without competition
we have from Proposition 2 for the manufacturer
V M =
1
2
[(p1; bq) + (N   1)(p; bq) NOut] :
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Observe that without competition the choice of bq that would maximize V M also maximizes
total industry prots. For R1 we obtain
V R1 = VR1(N) = V

M + Out  
1
N
N 1X
i=1
i [(p; bq)  Out] ;
so that we have for the di¤erence in the respective price-setting incentives
d
dp1
[V M   V R1] =
N   1
2
dbq
dp1

@
@bq(p; bq)

: (15)
When expression (15) is strictly positive, then this implies that the manufacturer prefers
a strictly higher price. Appealing to symmetry, the respective choice pn = pM at t = 1
is then strictly higher than the equilibrium outcome when retailers individually choose
prices, pn = pR. In the proof of Proposition 2 we show that still
dbq
dp1
> 0, as expected
from the analysis in Section 2. And we also show that @
@bq(p; bq) > 0 holds if and only
if from  < 1 there is a commitment problem, again in complete analogy to the analysis
without retailers in Section 2. Hence, at least in the present case without competition
between retailers, a wedge between pM and p

R exists if and only if quality perceptions
indeed matter as quality is not perfectly observed by all consumers. Then, expression (15)
captures the fact that only the manufacturer, but not individual retailers, internalizes the
positive e¤ect that a change in price has on quality and quality perceptions.
Proposition 2 Consider the case where the manufacturer sells through N non-competing
retailers. Then, the manufacturers preferred retail price, pM , is the same as that chosen
individually by retailers, pR, only when there is no role for quality perceptions as  = 1.
Otherwise, both price and quality are strictly higher when the manufacturer controls retail
prices: pM > p

R and q

M > q

R.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 is silent about implications for welfare and consumer surplus, to which
we turn below. It embodies our rst channel through which a manufacturers control
over retail prices, notably through RPM, has implications for prices and quality even
when retailers do not perform non-contractible actions, as the opportunism problem lies
between the manufacturer and consumers, and even when intrabrand competition is not
an issue, as seen by the fact that with xed quality prices do not di¤er (pM = p

R). The
reason is a free-riding problem of retailers on the e¤ect that individual retail prices have
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on quality perceptions. This is the essence of the "image theory" of RPM, as discussed in
the Introduction, where in our model "image" relates to quality perceptions.
Note next that the manufacturers preferred choice, pM , is not a¤ected by the number
of non-competing retailers, while the retailersfree-riding problem is aggravated as their
number N increases.
Corollary 1 When quality perceptions matter as  2 (0; 1), the di¤erence pM   pR > 0 is
strictly increasing in N . Consequently, also the di¤erence in equilibrium quality, qM qR >
0, is strictly increasing in N .
Proof. See Appendix.
It is worthwhile to note that while pM maximizes the manufacturers prots, the price
that prevails under retailer "price ownership", pR, does not maximize the joint prots of
retailers. In fact, retailers would jointly be best o¤ when setting pn = pM , i.e., exactly
the price that would prevail under manufacturer "price ownership"! As is the essence
of a free-riding problem, they have however a private incentive to deviate by setting a
strictly lower price at their own market. The coincidence of pM and the symmetric price
that would maximize total retailer prots does no longer hold when we introduce retailer
competition in Section 5.
Welfare Comparison. We now consider the case of linear demand D (pn; q) = q   pn
and constant marginal cost of production 1
2k
q2. We relegate a full derivation of expressions
to the subsequent proof. For t = 2 we obtain now explicitly
bq = p+pp2 + p2 (2 + ) k
2 + 
: (16)
where p = 1
N
PN
n=1 pn. The rst-order condition for pn = p = p

R becomes

1
N
 (k + bq)p  bq(3bq 2p)
2k

( + 2)bq   p + (bq)22k   2p+ bq = 0: (17)
The respective condition for pn = p = pM is also obtained from (17) when setting N = 1.
This follows simply as, rst, with N = 1 there is no di¤erence between the two cases and
as, second, pM does not depend on N , as noted above.
For a particular numerical specication, Figure 1 plots the two prices pM and p

R as a
function of the degree of transparency about quality, . For this example only we have
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Figure 1: This gure shows pM and p

R, next to the prices that maximize welfare, p

W , and
consumer surplus, pCS, as a function of . Parameter values are k = 2 and N =1.
made the di¤erence between the two scenarios largest, namely by letting N !1. Then,
the retailersequilibrium choice of pR does not internalize at all the implications that prices
have on quality perception.
Prices are always the same when  = 1, as then quality perceptions do not matter. For
all lower values of  > 0 we have pM > p

R. In Figure 1 we have also characterized the
prices that would maximize total welfare and consumer surplus, pW and p

CS. Intuitively,
it holds that pW > p

CS, as total welfare is not a¤ected by mere transfers from consumers
to rms. Further, at  = 1 note that both e¢ ciency benchmark prices are strictly lower
than the price that would be obtained in the market, pM = p

R. We now compare the
retailersindividually preferred price pR with the two e¢ ciency benchmarks. As  becomes
su¢ ciently low, pR falls below both the price p

W that would maximize total welfare (when
 < W ) and the lower price p

CS that would maximize consumer surplus (when  < CS).
The deadweight loss that a higher price would entail and even the direct loss to consumers,
at least for price increases that are not too large, is more than compensated by the resulting
increase in equilibrium quality. Proposition 3 shows that these results hold generally for
our specication.
The implications for consumer surplus are also brought out more clearly in Figure 2.
The non-monotonic line plots the di¤erence between consumer surplus at pR and p

CS,
CS(pR)  CS(pCS). It is zero at at  = 0, where demand becomes zero, and at  = CS,
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Figure 2: Consumer surplus for pM and p

R, net of maximum consumer surplus at p

CS, as
a function of . Parameter values are k = 2 and N =1.
while it is otherwise strictly negative. More important is the intersection with the di¤erence
CS(pM) CS(pCS), indicating that CS(pM) > CS(pR) holds for low levels of transparency
0 <  < 0CS and CS(p

M) < CS(p

R) holds for high levels of transparency 
0
CS <  < 1.
While to save space we do not plot this separately, the same picture is obtained when
we consider total welfare: For all  below some threshold 0W welfare is higher when the
manufacturer controls the price. This threshold is intuitively (considerably) higher than
0CS.
Proposition 3 In the chosen linear-quadratic specication, the following comparison of
prices and e¢ ciency (in any given market) holds:
i) For low levels of transparency , the price preferred by retailers is strictly below both
the price that would maximize consumer surplus and the price that would maximize total
welfare (pR < p

CS and p

R < p

W ), while for high values it is strictly higher than both
(pR > p

CS and p

R > p

W ). The price preferred by manufactures is always strictly higher
than both e¢ ciency benchmarks (pM > p

CS and p

M > p

W ).
ii) For low levels of transparency , welfare and also consumer surplus are strictly higher
under the manufacturers preferred price (W (pM) > W (p

R) and CS(p

M) > CS(p

R)), while
for high values the opposite holds (W (pM) < W (p

R) and CS(p

M) < CS(p

R)).
Proof. See Appendix.
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Together, the comparison of consumer surplus and welfare brings out two key insights.
The rst is that from the perspective of both consumer surplus and welfare, e¢ ciency can
be higher under pM even though this exceeds p

R. The reason is the thereby induced increase
in quality. The second insight is the role of quality perceptions and transparency. In the
linear-quadratic specication, the free-riding problem under retailer "price ownership"
becomes su¢ ciently important when the fraction of consumers who do not observe quality
is su¢ ciently large. In this case consumer surplus and total welfare are both strictly lower
when retailers individually choose prices in their own interest. The opposite holds when
transparency is su¢ ciently high, so that perceptions matter less.
5 Retailer Competition
Given our preceding analysis, we turn right to the choice of prices in t = 1. Recall that we
are interested in the di¤erence in price setting incentives between the manufacturer and
individual retailers. As we already observed that for some exogenously xed quality level
incentives are the same, again only the indirect e¤ect matters, i.e., the e¤ect that prices
have on quality. That is:
d
dp1
[V M   V R1] =
dbq
dp1
d
dbq [V M   V R1]
=
dbq
dp1
"
1
N
N 1X
i=1
i
d
dbqIn(i)  1N
NX
i=1
i
d
dbqOut(i  1)
#
: (18)
We assume again concavity of prots, now of In(i) and Out(i) in bq. The second sum
in (18) captures the e¤ects that a higher induced quality level has on the prots of non-
agreeing retailers under various contingencies (i.e., depending on the number of agreeing
retailers).14 Without competition, these terms were equal to zero. With competition,
these terms generate a wedge between the preference of the manufacturer and that of any
retailer when
d
dbqOut(i) < 0 for 1  i  N   1,
as then a higher quality of the manufacturers product undermines the "outside option"
of a non-agreeing retailer. This makes the manufacturer prefer a higher retail price as
the thereby induced higher quality reduces retailersprots when they do not come to
an agreement with the manufacturer. This ultimately benets the manufacturer. The
14Note for completeness that clearly ddbqOut(0) = 0 as then there is no retailer that o¤ers the incumbent
manufacturers product.
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presently discussed e¤ect thus isolates another mechanism through which a conict of
interest between retailers and the manufacturer can lead to di¤erent preferences regarding
the retail price.
Without competition, we know already that the rst term in (18) is zero when  = 1
and otherwise strictly positive ("free riding" problem). More generally, it captures the
e¤ect that quality has on the joint prots of agreeing retailers, again summed up over all
possible contingencies, that is, whether one or up to N 1 retailers agree.15 At rst it may
seem intuitive that all expressions d
dbqIn(i) should be positive, i.e., that a higher quality
increases "insiders" prots, in particular when there is competition. However, this ignores
the fact that the provision of quality is costly. To sign also this term and thus ultimately
the whole expression, we proceed in two steps.
Transparency. Recall that for  < 1 there is an opportunism problem vis-à-vis con-
sumers who do not directly observe quality. Precisely, while for given prices the choice of
qBR maximizes the manufacturers prots, V M , this is not so for the resulting equilibrium
quality bq. While in equilibrium it holds that bq = qBR, bq only satises the respective
rst-order condition when  = 1. Consider now instead the auxiliary problem to choose
quality bq so as to maximize the prots of an agreeing coalition with i retailers, iIn(i).
As  becomes su¢ ciently small, the equilibrium quality is always too low, given the op-
portunism problem, regardless of the choice of i = 1; :::; N . Appealing to concavity, also
the rst term in (18) is then strictly positive.
Proposition 4 Consider the general case where retailers can be in competition. When
 > 0 is su¢ ciently small so that a large fraction of consumers must rely on quality
perceptions, the manufacturers preferred retail price and the thereby induced quality are
both strictly higher than when retailers individually choose their preferred retail price.
Hence, when transparency is low so that quality perceptions matter a lot, we can
sign both terms in expression (18). The manufacturers optimal choice of the retail price
will then be strictly higher than that of retailers, implying also a strictly higher quality,
both as the manufacturer cares about the positive impact of quality on his bargaining
position (the second sum in (18)) and as the manufacturer cares more about the problem
of underprovision of quality due to the opportunism problem vis-à-vis consumers (the rst
term in (18)).
15The respective term for N agreeing retailers dropped out as here we consider the di¤erence in prots
between the manufacturer and a retailer.
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Linear Demand. We now return to our specication with linear demand, for which we
extend the quadratic utility function to the case withN di¤erentiated retailers. Demand
at retailer n is given by16
(qn   pn)  
X
m6=n
(qm   pm) : (19)
We are now specic about the choices made by non-agreeing retailers. Also applying the
same timing of moves, we suppose that then consumers can buy a good of xed quality q0
and price p0 at these retailers. Considering again symmetric prices for the manufacturers
products, joint prots generated with one of i agreeing retailers are then given by
In (i) = [(1   (i  1)) (bq   p)   (N   i) (q0   p0)] (p  k (bq)) :
Prots of each one of the (N   i) non-agreeing retailers are given by
Out (i) = [(1   (N   i  1)) (q0   p0)  i (bq   p)] (p0   k0) :
Proposition 5 Consider the case with linear demand and competition. Then for all  > 0
the manufacturers preferred retail price and the thereby induced quality are both strictly
higher than when retailers individually choose their preferred retail price.
Proof. See Appendix.
Incidentally, competition can now also lead to "gold-plating" in terms of quality by
the manufacturer, as he thereby improves his bargaining position. To illustrate this, take
 = 1, such that equilibrium quality maximizes V M and, by the envelope theorem, that
the manufacturers preferred price is determined by setting the partial derivative with
respect to price equal to zero. With the linear demand specication, note that a marginal
price reduction has the same demand expanding e¤ect as a marginal increase in quality.
Therefore, by optimality, also the marginal cost of an increase in quality (k0 (q)) has to
be equal to the "marginal cost" of a price reduction, which is equal to one. Using again
k (q) = 1
2k
q2, this yields qM = k (provided that p = p

M). Noting that total welfare is now
W = N (1  )

1
2
(q   p)2 + (q   p) (p  k (q))

:
16That is, a representative consumer derives utility of u (x; q) =
PN
n=1

qnxn   12x2n
 Pm6=n xnxm;
where xn denotes the quantity bought at retailer n. Setting @u=@xn = pn and solving for xn yields (19),
where  = = [(   ) ( + (N   1))] and  and  are such that +(N 2)( )(+(N 1)) = 1.
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For given symmetric price p the welfare maximizing quality would be
qW =
2
3
(k + p)
and thus strictly decreasing in p. Evaluated at p = pM , as this is strictly decreasing in
,17 this suggests that quality may be indeed too high when there is su¢ cient competition.
This can be conrmed with respective threshold
00 =

3
2 (N   1)

k
k + q0   p0 + 2 (p0   k0) :
Still, despite such "gold plating", here for  > 00, we can show that the outcome may still
be more e¢ cient than when price and quality are lower under the respective prices choices
of retailers.18 This observation thus conrms the papers main message of identifying an
e¢ ciency rationale for RPM through the described "image theory".
6 Concluding Remarks
We consider a manufacturers incentives to choose quality in an environment where this is
not observed directly by all consumers, so that their quality perceptions matter. We further
ask how these incentives are inuenced by the products price. Here, we derive various
channels through which a higher price can induce higher quality and quality perception by
those consumers who do not directly observe quality but form rational expectations. This
set-up is then embedded into a game where either retailers or the manufacturer control
the retail price ("price ownership").
We isolate di¤erent sources of a conict of interest between retailers and the manufac-
turer, which lead to di¤erent prices and qualities depending on which side exerts control
over prices. One channel that supports such a conict of interest works through a repu-
tation spill-over across retailers. Each individual retailer does not take into account how
his price choice a¤ects the overall perception of the products quality and, thereby, also
equilibrium quality choice. Then, "price ownership" of the manufacturer leads to higher
quality. Though this is associated with a higher price, we identify when e¢ ciency and
consumer surplus are both still higher. A second channel supporting a conict of inter-
est between the manufacturer and retailers operates when there is competition between
17Precisely: dp

M
d =
 3
2(3 2)2 [(q0   p0) + 2 (p0   k0)].
18Such an example is obtained for k = 2, N = 2, as well as p0 = 0:5, q0 = 1:5, k0 = 0:1 for the outside
option, in which case we have 00  0:79. Welfare is then higher under pM than under pR if  > 0:24.
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retailers. Then, a higher (perceived) quality, which would be induced by a higher retail
price, reduces a retailers but increases the manufacturers outside option in bilateral ne-
gotiations. Again, the manufacturers preferred price and the thereby induced equilibrium
quality are higher than when retailers control prices.
As we discussed in detail, we chose a particular timing of strategies for our model.
Notably, this deprived wholesale prices of their role to better align incentives. We argued
why this could follow from a strict implementation of the prohibition of RPM. We also
noted that the pressure from continuous negotiations, for instance, may make retail prices
indeed more persistent than wholesale arrangements. The key implication that derives
from our modeling specication is that retail prices a¤ect the manufacturers incentives
and thereby both quality and quality perceptions. Future work could model the dynamic
interplay between wholesale and retail prices and the continuous choice of quality, taking
into account that all these choices are to some extent (and only to some extent) persistent.
In particular, quality and quality perceptions would then be the result of current as well
as of past price choices at all retailers.
7 Appendix A: Omitted Derivations and Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. For contingencies without an agreement with R1, we have the
joint prot condition
V 0M(i) + iV
0
Rn(i) = 
0
In(i);
which together with (8) yields
(i+ 1)V 0M(i) = iV
0
M(i  1) +

0In(i)  i0Out;Rn(i  1)

:
From this we obtain for the manufacturer
V 0M(i) =
1
i+ 1
iX
j=1

0In(j)  j0Out;Rn(j   1)

: (20)
When there is an agreement with R1,we have the joint prot condition
V 1M(i) + (i  1)V 1Rn(i) + V 1R1(i) = 1In(i):
Here, we can substitute (6) and (7), which yields
V 1M(i) =
1
i (i+ 1)
i 1X
j=0
(j + 1)

1In(j + 1)  j1Out(j)  0Out;R1(j) + V 0M (j)

:
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Making use of (20) we obtain V 1M(i) and, together with (6) also V
1
R1(i). Choosing i = N
yields the nal characterization.19 Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Denote by (pn; q; bq) the bilateral prots for an agreement with
retailer n, which depend only on the respective price pn as well as actual and perceived
quality. We will rst make use of this notation to derive equilibrium quality at stage
t = 2, bq = bq = q. Subsequently, as done in the main text, we can further simplify
notation by substituting for this choice. At t = 2 the manufacturer chooses q to maximize
his own payo¤. With the preceding observations and making use of Proposition 1, without
competition we have
V M =
1
2
"
NX
n=1
(pn; q; bq) NOut# ; (21)
so that
qBR = arg max
q
NX
n=1
(pn; q; bq):
Or, with the rst-order condition as in (2), qBR solves

"
NX
n=1
(pn   k(qBR))Dq (pn; qBR)
#
  k0(qBR)
NX
n=1
[D(pn; qBR) + (1  )D(pn; bq)] = 0.
(22)
Recall that at this stage we solve for the equilibrium where a consumer who does not
observe quality holds rational beliefs, so that qBR = bq = bq. Note again that prots in one
retail market currently depend on the price in another retail market only through the e¤ect
that the other price has on the manufacturers incentives to adjust quality - and, for  < 1,
on the respective beliefs of uninformed consumers. Hence, the equilibrium requirement forbq at t = 2 is that, in analogy to condition (3),
z(pn; bq) :=  " NX
n=1
(pn   k(bq))Dq (pn; bq)#  k0(bq) NX
n=1
D(pn; bq) = 0, (23)
so that from implicit di¤erentiation
dbq
dpn
=
1
 zbq [Dq(pn; bq)  k0(bq)Dp(pn; bq) +  (pn   k(bq))Dpq(pn; bq)] :
19Again, we suppose here that the incremental prot for each agreement is, for all contingencies, positive.
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As in Lemma 1 this is strictly positive when, where we have rearranged terms,
zbq = 
"
NX
n=1
[(pn   k(bq))Dqq (pn; bq)  2k0(bq)Dq (pn; bq)]#  k00(bq) NX
n=1
D(pn; bq)
 (1 + )k0(bq) NX
n=1
Dq (pn; bq)
< 0:
This holds both as the rst term is strictly negative from concavity of the program for qBR
and the second term is strictly negative from k0 > 0 and Dq > 0.
For the manufacturers optimal price choice we obtain
dV M
dpn
= Dp (pn; bq) (pn   k(bq)) +D (pn; bq) (24)
+
XN
n0=1
[Dq (pn0 ; bq) (pn0   k(bq)) D (pn0 ; bq) k0(bq)] dbq
dpn
= 0:
When some retailer n (notably R1) could optimally choose pn, after substituting into
Proposition 1, this would satisfy the requirement
dV Rn
dpn
= Dp (pn; bq) (pn   k(bq)) +D (pn; bq) (25)
+ [Dq (pn; bq) (pn   k(bq)) D (pn; bq) k0(bq)] dbq
dpn
= 0:
For  = 1 we have from (22) that
Dq (pn; bq) (pn   k(bq)) D (pn; bq) k0(bq) = 0;
so that from the respective rst-order conditions and focusing on a symmetric outcome we
have pM = p

R. For  < 1 note rst that, again at the symmetric choice pn = p, it holds
that
Dq (pn; bq) (pn   k(bq)) D (pn; bq) k0(bq) > 0;
from which, together with (25) and (24) as well as dbq
dpn
> 0, we have in this case that
pM > p

R. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. An immediate and intuitive way to see that pM is independent
of N is to maximize V M directly with respect to a symmetric price p. Note rst that at
symmetric prices pn = p, we have that
dbq
dp
= N dbq
dpn
and further that dbq
dp
is simply obtained
from, with a slight abuse of notation,
z(p; bq) =  [(p  k(bq))Dq (p; bq)]  k0(bq)D(p; bq) = 0.
26
With this at hands, the rst-order condition for p = pM can be written as
Dp (p; bq) (p  k(bq)) +D (p; bq) + [Dq (p; bq) (p  k(bq)) D (p; bq) k0(bq)] dbq
dp
= 0 (26)
and is thus indeed independent of N . We next argue that, instead, pR is strictly decreasing
in N . Using concavity of the program, from (25) this is the case when, at symmetric prices
pn = p = p

R, this holds for
dbq
dpn
. As zpn is independent of N , we only need to verify that
jzbqj is increasing, which holds as, using pn = p, it is proportional to N . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Joint prots of the manufacturer together with retailer n are
given by
(pn; q; bq) = (q   pn)pn   1
2k
q2

;
where we use q = q + (1  ) bq. The linear demand structure allows us to write the
equilibrium condition for bq in (23) in terms of the average retail price p = 1
N
PN
n=1 pn :


p  1
2k
(bq)2  1
k
bq (bq   p) = 0; (27)
which can be solved for bq as given by (16) and used in the rst-order condition (17).
Further, to calculate the example, for N !1 expression (17) simplies to
(bq)2
2k
  2pR + bq = 0:
To compare e¢ ciency, from the utility function of the respective representative consumer
we obtain in each market the consumer surplus
CS =
1
2
(q   p)2
and total welfare
W =
1
2
(bq   p)2 + (bq   p) (p  k (bq)) :
Consider assertion i). We will rst show that pM > p

CS. To this end rewrite condition
(26) for D (p; bq) = bq   p to obtain
dbq
dp

pM
=
(p  k (bq))  (bq   p)
(p  k (bq))  (bq   p) k0 (bq) < 1: (28)
This follows from (16) which implies that D (p; bq) > 0 only if p < 2k, such that bq < 2k
and thus k0 (bq) < 1. The assertion that pM > pCS then follows from
dCS
dp

pM
= (bq   p) dbq
dp

pM
  1
!
< 0: (29)
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Recall next from the proof of Proposition 2 that pR = p

M for  = 1, which implies that
also pR > p

CS for large values of . Consider next the opposite end:  = 0. There, we
have pCS = 0 and that
dpCS
d
!1 as  ! 0.20 Likewise, for  = 0 we obtain pR = 0 and
dpR
d

=0
=
k

3
p
N (9N   8) 
q
9N 8
N
+ 9  7N

4 (N   1) ;
which is equal to 5=4
 p
5  1 k for N = 2, it strictly decreases in N , and it converges to
k=2 as N ! 1. Given the boundedness of dpR
d
, we have thus shown that pCS > p

R must
hold for small values of , regardless of the choice of N . (In fact, for N !1 one can even
solve in closed form for the threshold CS =
2
3
.)
Furthermore, from (16) we obtain for  = 0 that bq = p and thus dbq
dp
= 1, which in
turn implies from (29) that dCS
dp

pM
= 0 so that since W = CS + , we get pW = p

M .
Furthermore, solving the system of (17) (with N = 1) and (27) for the equilibrium values
pM and q

M yields that p

M =
2
3
k for  = 0. Hence, we have that pW > p

R for small values
of . Since W =  + CS it follows from (29) that pW < p

M for all  > 0 and therefore,
since pR = p

M for  = 1, also p

W < p

R for large values of .
Now turn to assertion ii) and consider again  = 1 where it holds that pR = p

M so that
CS (pR) = CS (p

M) (and also W (p

R) = W (p

M)). However, since at  = 1, it holds that
dW (pR)
d
=
dCS (pR)
d
=

1
N

k2
36
<
k2
36
=
dCS (pM)
d
=
dW (pM)
d
;
it follows that CS (pM) < CS (p

R) and W (p

M) < W (p

R) for high values of .
Now consider  = 0, where CS (pR) = CS (p

M) = 0 and, further,
dCS(pR)
d
=
dCS(pM)
d
=
0. However,
d2CS(pM)
d2
= 4
9
k2 and
d2CS (pR)
d2
= k2
p
9N   8  5pN
2
16N
;
which, for N = 2 equals 0:477k2 > 4
9
k2, but for N = 3 this equals 0:385k2 < 4
9
k2.
Furthermore,
d2CS(pR)
d2
is strictly decreasing in N and converges to 1=4k2 as N ! 1.
Therefore, if N > 2, CS (pR) < CS (p

M) for small values of . Finally, we have W (p

R) =
W (pM) = 0 but
dW(pR)
d
= 0 and
dW(pM)
d
= 8
27
k2 at  = 0, so that W (pR) < W (p

M) for
small values of . Q.E.D.
20Precisely: pCS = (1 + )
p
 (2 + )k    (2 + ) k:
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Proof of Proposition 5. With linear demand, we have
V M =
N
6

[(3  2(N   1)) (bq   p)  (N   1) (q0   p0)] (p  k (bq))
  [(3   (N   1)) (q0   p0)  2 (N   1) (bq   p)] [p0   k0]

and
V M V R1 =
(N + 1)
6
  
N 1
N+1

(3  2 (N   2)) (bq   p)  (N   1) (q0   p0) [p  k (bq)]
  [(3   (N   1)) (q0   p0)  2 (N   1) (bq   p)] [p0   k0]

:
(30)
Now observe that from the rst-order condition for qBR we obtain with qBR = bq = bq that
(3  2(N   1)) [ (p  k (bq))  (bq   p) k0 (bq)]
+ (N   1) [(q0   p0) k0 (bq) + 2 (p0   k0)]
= 0:
This implies that
(3  2(N   1)) [(p  k (bq))  (bq   p) k0 (bq)]
   (N   1) [(q0   p0) k0 (bq) + 2 (p0   k0)] ; (31)
with a strict inequality for  < 1. Di¤erentiating (30) with respect to q yields
d (V M   V R1)
dq
bq = (N + 1)6
  
N 1
N+1

(3  2 (N   2)) [p  k (bq)  (bq   p) k0 (bq)]
+(N   1) (q0   p0) k0 (bq) + 2 (N   1) [p0   k0]

;
from which, by using (31) and after some transformations, we obtain
d (V M   V R1)
dq
bq   (N   1)

6  5(N   1)
3  2(N   1)

[(q0   p0) k0 (bq) + 2 (p0   k0)]
> 0;
where by (31) the rst inequality holds even strictly for  < 1 and the second inequality
follows from  (N   1) < 1. Hence, we can conclude that pM > pR and consequently
qM > q

R Q.E.D.
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